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OBDUSKEY V. MCCARTHEY & HOLTHUS LLP:
DECLINING TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN
JUDICIAL AND NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
IN FURTHERANCE OF THE FDCPA’S MISSION
M OSHE Y. GUGENHEIM *©
A BSTRACT

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act was created to eliminate abusive debt
collection practices and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers
against debt collection abuses. The Act contains a general definitional provision
subjecting those who fit under the definition to the Act’s requirements. Additionally,
the Act contains a limited purposes provision for certain forms of debt collection
which are subject to specific requirements. While in some instances it is clear as to
who qualifies as a debt collector under the Act, in other instances it is less clear. One
instance of ambiguity is the enforcement of security interests. From the Act itself, it
is unclear if entities, such as law firms, who enforce security interests are considered
debt collectors under the Act’s general definitional provision thereby requiring those
entities to adhere to the Act’s various requirements. Due to a circuit split on the
matter, the Supreme Court answered the ambiguity in Obduskey v. McCarthey.
The Supreme Court held that entities enforcing security interests are not debt
collectors as defined by the Act’s general definitional provision. Thus, law firms and
other entities who conduct foreclosures are not required to follow all of the Act’s
requirements. However, the Court cautioned that abusive debt collection practices
could transform such entities into debt collectors under the Act. While the Supreme
Court may have missed an opportunity to reconcile the circuit split by distinguishing
between judicial and non-judicial foreclosures, the Court was correct to decline to
make such a distinction since, by doing so, it protects debtors in spirit of the Act’s
purpose.
INTRODUCTION

In Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus LLP, the Supreme Court addressed whether a
business which is involved in the enforcements of security is considered a “debt
collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s1 (“the Act”) general
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definitional provision.2 In light of statutory construction, legislative history, and
legislative intent, the Court held that an entity enforcing non-judicial foreclosure is
not a “debt collector” under the Act’s general definitional provision.3 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court missed an opportunity to reconciliate a circuit split by
declining to distinguish between entities enforcing judicial versus non-judicial
foreclosures.4 However, the Court was correct to decline to make such a distinction,
as the Court’s analysis better protects debtors in the spirit of the Act’s primary
purpose.5
THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
Congress enacted the Act in 1977 “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by
debt collectors” and to “promote consistent State action to protect consumers
against debt collection abuses.”6 There are two pertinent provisions defining debt
collection under the Act: the general definitional provision (subjecting debt
collectors to all of the Act’s requirements) and the limited-purposes provision
(subjecting specific forms of debt collectors to specific requirements).7
The Definitional Provisions
The general definitional provision is found in 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6).8 That provision
states that the term “debt collector” “means any person . . . in any business the
principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects
or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or asserted to be owed or
due another.”9 The limited-purposes provision is found in 15 U.S.C. 1692(f)(6) and
states, “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6) [the] term [debt collector] also
includes any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the
enforcement of security interests.”10

* Moshe Y. Gugenheim, J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, 2021.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (2006).
2. Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP,139 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2019).
3. Id. at 1040.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 101–122.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 123–26.
6. Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1040-41 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 1035–36 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a),(6); § 1692(f)(6)).
8. Id. at 1035–37.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1037.
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I.

T HE CASE

In 2007, Dennis Obduskey obtained a mortgage loan from Magnus Financial
Corporation, secured by Obduskey’s property in Bailey, Colorado.11 The loan was
subsequently acquired by Freddie Mac, and Wells Fargo Bank was assigned as the
servicer.12 In 2014, after Obduskey defaulted on the loan, Wells Fargo retained
McCarthey & Holthus LLP to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure13 on Obduskey’s
property.14 McCarthey mailed Obduskey a letter that said it had been instructed to
commence foreclosure against Obduskey’s property, disclosed the amount of the
debt, and identified the creditor (Wells Fargo). 15 Obduskey sent back a letter
“invoking § 1692(g)(b) of the Act, which provides that if a consumer disputes the
amount of a debt, a “debt collector” must “cease collection” until it “obtains
verification of the debt” and mails a copy to the debtor.”16 Instead of sending the
verification, McCarthey continued with the non-judicial foreclosure by filing a
notice of election and demand with the county trustee.17 Obduskey filed suit
alleging that McCarthey had violated the Act by not adhering to the verification
procedure.18
The district court granted McCarthey’s motion to dismiss reasoning that the
majority view on the matter is that foreclosure activities are not covered under the
Act.19 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, reasoning
that the mere enforcement of a non-judicial foreclosure does not make one a debt
collector under the Act.20 In light of a circuit split about the application of the Act to
non-judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court granted Obduskey’s petition for
certiorari.21
11. Obduskey v. Fargo, No. 15-CV-01734-RBJ, 2016 WL 4091174, at 1 (D. Colo. July 19, 2016), aff’d sub
nom. Obduskey v. Wells Fargo, 879 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus
LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, (2019).
12. Id.
13. See Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. 1029 at 1034 (2019) (“About half the States also provide for what is known as
nonjudicial foreclosure, where notice to the parties and sale of the property occur outside court
supervision.”).The main difference between judicial and non-judicial foreclosure is that with non-judicial
foreclosure, an entity such as a trustee conducts the sale as opposed to judicial foreclosure where the court
conducts the sale. See id.
14. Fargo, 2016 WL 4091174 at 1.
15. Obduskey 139 S. Ct. at 1035.
16. Id.
17. Id. Under Colorado non-judicial foreclosure law one conducting a non-judicial foreclosure “must first
mail the homeowner certain preliminary information, including the telephone number for the Colorado
foreclosure hotline. Thirty days later, the creditor may file a ‘notice of election and demand’ with a state official
called a ‘public trustee.’” Id. at 1034.
18. Id. at 1035.
19. Obduskey v. Fargo, No. 15-CV-01734-RBJ, 2016 WL 4091174 at 3 (D. Colo. July 19, 2016).
20. Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1035.
21. Id.
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II.

T HE COURTS R EASONING

In Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, the Supreme Court unanimously held
that an entity conducting a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding is not considered a
debt collector under the general definitional provision of the Act.22 Justice Breyer,
writing for the Court, based the Court’s ruling on three grounds: (1) statutory
construction, (2) legislative history, and (3) legislative intent.23 Justice Breyer also
discussed and rejected each of Obduskey’s arguments for why McCarthey was a
debt collector under the Act.24
A. The Court’s Reasons in Support of its Holding
1.

Statutory Construction

The opinion starts with statutory construction.25 The Act defines a debt collector as
one who “regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts.”26
The proceeds of a foreclosure sale are given to a creditor to satisfy the debt.27 Thus,
a business which conducts non-judicial foreclosure sales indirectly collects debt
and, therefore, qualifies as a debt collector under the Act’s general definitional
provision.28 However, the Act also contains a limited purpose definition when it
says, “[for] purposes of section 1692(f)(6)…a debt collector also includes (a
business) the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.”29
This definition includes a business which conducts non-judicial foreclosure sales. 30
The limited purpose definition, therefore, makes it clear that a business conducting
a non-judicial foreclosure is not included under the Act’s general definition of a debt
collector or else the Act would be superfluous.31
2.

Legislative Intent

The Court then turns to legislative intent.32 Congress likely structured the Act in a
way which coincides with state non-judicial foreclosure schemes.33 The Act limits
22.

Id. at 1040.
Id. at 1036–38.
24. Id. at 1038–40.
25. Id. at 1036–37.
26. Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1036 (2019) (citing §15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1036–37.
29. Id. at 1037 (citing § 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f)(6)).
30. See id. (holding that the limited-purpose definition encompasses “a business, like McCarthey” which
enforces non-judicial foreclosures).
31. Id.
32. Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1037 (2019).
33. Id.
23.
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debt collectors from communicating consumer debt to third parties.34 However, in
a foreclosure sale, the “purpose of publicizing a sale is to attract bidders, ensure
that the sale price is fair, and thereby protect the borrower from further liability.”
35
Congress created the Act to protect the debtor and a prevention of advertising a
foreclosure sale would hurt the debtor.36 Thus, if businesses which conduct nonjudicial foreclosure sales were considered debt collectors under the Act, the Act
would clash with state non-judicial foreclosure schemes.37 Therefore, Congress
likely did not intend for those businesses to be considered debt collectors under the
Act.38
3.

Legislative History

Lastly, the Court turns to legislative history.39 When drafting the Act, there were
two versions presented in Congress.40 One version explicitly included entities
enforcing non-judicial foreclosures as debt collectors.41 Another version excluded
non-judicial foreclosure sales from the Act.42 Thus, it makes sense that Congress
compromised between the two drafts, subjecting entities enforcing non-judicial
foreclosures as debt collectors only under the limited purpose section of the Act.43
B.

The Court’s Rejection of Obuskey’s Arguments
1.

Superfluity Argument

Obduskey argued that the Act’s general definitional provision includes businesses
that conduct non-judicial foreclosure sales.44 The limited purpose section, by
specifying those enforcing security interests, does make the Act superfluous as the
limited purpose definition was meant for “repo men” — those who seize collateral
from the debtor’s property at night.45 Obduskey argues that repo men do not fit
under the Act’s general definitional provision.46 The Court dismissed this argument
reasoning that repo activity is an indirect collection of a debt since it is undertaken

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. (citing § 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c)(b)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1037-38 (2019).
Id.
Id. at 1037.
Id. at 1038.
Id.
See id.
Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1038 (2019).
Id.
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to collect some or all of the defaulted debt.47 Thus, “repo men” do fit under the
Act’s general definitional provision.48 Therefore, if the enforcement of a security
interest was included in the Act’s general definition, the Act’s limited purpose
section would be superfluous.49
2.

Venue Argument

Obduskey pointed to the Act’s venue provision which states, “[a]ny debt collector
who brings any legal action on a debt against any consumer shall…in the case of an
action to enforce an interest in real property securing the consumer’s obligation,
bring such action only in a judicial district.”50 Since the provision includes judicial
foreclosures, it must also include non-judicial foreclosures.51 The Court rejected this
argument as well reasoning that the venue provision only speaks of judicial, and not
non-judicial, foreclosures.52 Additionally, the venue provision merely references a
debt collector who is conducting a foreclosure. 53 It does not mean that one who
conducts a foreclosure is a debt collector under Act.54
3.

Transformation into a Debt Collector Argument

Obduskey argued that even assuming arguendo that a business conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure is not a debt collector under the Act, McCarthey transformed
itself into a debt collector “by sending notices that any ordinary homeowner would
understand as an attempt to collect a debt backed up by the threat of
foreclosure.”55 The Court rejected this argument reasoning that if the non-judicial
foreclose is not debt collection under the Act, then neither are the legal means
necessary to carry out non-judicial foreclosure.56 Here, McCarthey was obligated
under Colorado non-judicial foreclosure law to send the notices.57 Therefore,
McCarthey did not act as a debt collector when sending the notices.58

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1039 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(i)(a) (2006)) (emphasis added).
Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (2019).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (2019).
Id.
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4.

Loophole Argument

Lastly, Obduskey argued that the Court’s decision excluding businesses conducting
non-judicial foreclosure sales as debt collectors gives creditors a loophole under the
Act to engage in abusive practices. 59 The Court rejected this argument reasoning
that States guard against such practices, for example, by requiring notice to the
debtor.60 It is up to Congress, and not the judiciary, to determine if these safeguards
are adequate.61
III.

T HE CIRCUIT SPLIT

There is a circuit split on the application of the Act to non-judicial foreclosure
proceedings.62 In Vien–Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., the Ninth Circuit ruled that
a trustee conducting a non-judicial foreclosure is not a debt collector under the
Act’s primary definitional provision (and, thus, not subject to the Act’s
requirements).63 Ho, the debtor, borrowed money from creditor Countrywide Bank
to buy a home.64 The loan was secured by a deed of trust with ReconTrust acting as
the Trustee.65 After Ho missed her payments, ReconTrust sent her a Notice of
Default and, subsequently, a Notice of Sale.66 Ho alleged that the notices violated
the Act by misrepresenting the amount of money she owed.67 The Ninth Circuit
rejected Ho’s argument reasoning that ReconTrust was not a debt collector under
the Act for the following reasons:68
First, the Act defines debt collectors generally as those who directly or indirectly
attempt to collect money.69 However, the objective of a non-judicial foreclosure is
to sell the security interest and foreclose redemption – not to collect money from
the debtor.70 Although money from the sale is used to pay the creditor, that is not

59.

Id. at 1040.
Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1035.
63. 858 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2016).
64. Id. at 570.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 570–71. ReconTrust was required to send the Notices to conform with California’s non-judicial
foreclosure process. See id. (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(a)(1), (3)).
67. Id. at 571 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)(2)(A) which says, “A debt collector may not use any false,
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without
limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: . . . The
false representation of . . . the character, amount, or legal status of any debt . . . .”).
68. Id. at 570–76.
69. Vien–Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 2016). (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(5),
(6)).
70. Id.
60.
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the object of the non-judicial foreclosure.71 In fact, in California, a creditor may not
bring a deficiency action after a foreclosure sale thereby showing that non-judicial
foreclosure is not annexed to debt collection.72
Second, if the Act’s general definitional provision included entities enforcing
security interests, it would render the limited purposes section of § 1692(f)(6) as
superfluous.73 Lastly, “[h]olding trustees liable under the [the Act] would subject
them to obligations that would frustrate their ability to comply with the California
statutes governing non-judicial foreclosure.”74 The court said, “[w]hen one
interpretation of an ambiguous federal statute would create a conflict with state
foreclosure law and another interpretation would not, respect for our federal
system counsels in favor of the latter.”75 Thus, the court ruled that ReconTrust as a
trustee enforcing a security interest was not a general debt collector under the Act
and, thus, not subject to the Act.76
On the other side of the circuit split, in Kaymark v. Bank of Am., the Third Circuit
ruled that an entity which enforces a security interest is considered a debt collector
under the Act.77 Dale Kaymark defaulted on a mortgage held by Bank of America
(“BOA”).78 On behalf of BOA, Udren Law Offices, P.C. (“Udren”) initiated judicial
foreclosure on Kaymark’s property in state court.79 The foreclosure complaint
received by Kaymark listed fees which, although were likely to occur, had not
occurred yet.80 Kaymark alleged that by listing the not-yet-incurred fees on the
complaint, Udren violated § 1692e(2)(A), (5), (10), and § 1692f(1) of the Act.81
71.

See id.
Id. The Court makes an analogy to a tow truck which tows a car due to the non-payment of parking
tickets. Id. Although one may be induced to pay parking tickets from the fear of having his or her car towed, the
fear of such a towing is not enough to transform the tow truck company into a debt collector. Id.
73. Id. at 573. The Act’s general definition of a “debt collector” to whom the Act generally applies to is
found in 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6). Id. at 572. The Act defines “debt collectors” as those who “regularly collect or
attempt to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due [to] another.” Id. The
Act’s limited purpose definition is found in 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f)(6) where the Act specifies that it “also includes”
entities whose principal business purpose is “the enforcement of security interests.” Id. at 573.
74. Id. at 575. The Court says, “[f]or example, the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from communicating
with third parties about the debt absent consent from the debtor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c)(b). But California law
requires the trustee to announce all trustee’s sales in a newspaper and mail the notice of default to various
third parties. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2924b(c)(1)–(2), 2924f(b). Moreover, the Act prohibits debt collectors from
directly communicating with debtors if the debt collector knows that the debtor is represented by counsel. 15
U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). California law requires the trustee to mail the notices of default and sale directly to the
borrower, and makes no exception for borrowers who are represented by counsel.” Id.
75. Vien–Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 576 (9th Cir. 2016).
76. Id. at 572.
77. 783 F.3d 168, 179 (3d Cir. 2015).
78. Id. at 171.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 174.
72.
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Udren argued that foreclosure actions cannot be the basis of an Act claim since
“[the Act] has the apparent objective of preserving creditors’ judicial remedies.”82
The court rejected the argument reasoning that foreclosure meets the definition of
debt collection under the Act.83 If entities enforcing foreclosure actions were not
considered debt collectors under the Act, it would create a loophole for debt
collectors when debt is secured by real property and foreclosure is used to collect
that interest.84 Additionally, “if a collector were able to avoid liability under the Act
simply by choosing to proceed in rem rather than in personam, it would undermine
the purpose of the Act.”85 Lastly, Congress, and not the courts, would have to
exclude foreclosure proceedings from debt collection given that the plain language
of the Act seems to indicate that such proceedings are covered. 86
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, the Supreme Court correctly held that
entities enforcing non-judicial foreclosures are not considered debt collectors
under the Act’s general definitional provision.87 The Court was correct to limit its
holding to entities enforcing non-judicial, and not judicial, foreclosures.88 However,
the Court missed an opportunity to reconciliate a circuit split when it left open the
issue of whether entities enforcing judicial foreclosures are considered debt
collectors under the Act.89
A. The Court correctly held that entities enforcing non-judicial foreclosures
are not considered debt collectors under the Act.
The Court’s strongest argument supporting its conclusion is its superfluity
argument.90 Under the Act’s general provision, an entity enforcing a foreclosure
would qualify as a debt collector since foreclosure is an indirect attempt to collect
a debt.91 However, the Act’s limited purposes provision specifies entities enforcing
82.

Id. at 178 (citing Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 296 (1995)).
Kaymark v. Bank of Am., 783 F.3d 168, 179 (3d Cir. 2015).
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., 396 F.3d 227, 236 (3d Cir.2005)).
86. Id. The Court also mentions Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 704 F.3d 453, 461 (C.A.6 2013) and Wilson
v. Draper & Goldberg, P. L. L. C. , 443 F.3d 373, 376 (C.A.4 2006) as cases where Circuits have held entities
enforcing non-judicial foreclosures as covered by the Act. Id.
87. 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1040 (2019).
88. Id. at 1039.
89. See id. See infra text accompanying notes 104–128.
90. See Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1037 (2019); see also Vien–Phuong Thi Ho
v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2016).
91. Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1036-37. But see ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d at 571 (holding that an entity
enforcing non-judicial foreclosure is not a “debt collector” under the Act, even “indirectly” since the object of
non-judicial foreclosure is to sell the security interest and foreclose redemption).
83.

Journal of Business and Technology Law Proxy

25

Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus LLP
security interests as debt collectors for the purposes of the limited provision.92
Thus, if the Act’s general definition included entities enforcing security interests, it
would render the limited purposes provision unnecessary.93
Judge Korman, in his concurrence in part and dissent in part to Vien–Phuong Thi
Ho v. ReconTrust Co., attempts to combat the superfluity argument by reasoning
that entities enforcing security interests act in different ways.94 There are entities
which “enforce security interests yet who do not typically engage in activity that
would also come within the definition of ‘debt collection.’”95 One example is a tow
truck driver.96 Additionally, some entities “do not [collect] with sufficient regularity
to bring them within the definition of ‘debt collector.’”97 However, all entities
enforcing security interests, including tow truck drivers and those who act
infrequently, would have been covered under the Act’s general definition.98 Thus,
the superfluity issue remains unresolved.99
Judge Korman argues that if trustees are not considered “debt collectors” under
the Act’s general provision, they will be able to engage in deceptive collection acts
which is contrary to Congress’s intent in creating the Act.100 However, the majority’s
holding in Obduskey is “limited to circumstances where an entity enforcing a nonjudicial foreclosure only takes the necessary steps required by state law.”101 Abusive
debt collection practices can transform such an entity into a debt collector under
the Act.102
B.

However, the Court missed an opportunity to reconciliate a circuit split
when it left open the issue of whether entities enforcing judicial
foreclosures are considered debt collectors under the Act.

The Supreme Court missed an opportunity to reconciliate the rulings of Kaymark v.
Bank of Am., and Vien–Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co, when it failed to elaborate
on the potential difference in terms of what is considered a debt collector between

92.

Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1037.
Id.
94. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d at 583 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. Id.
96. Vien–Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 583 (9th Cir. 2016) ((Korman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
97. Id.
98. See Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1040–41 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(combating the argument that the specific provision was intended for “repo men” – those who collect personal
property security interests).
99. Id.
100. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d at 583–84 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1039-40 (majority opinion).
102. Id. at 1040.
93.
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entities enforcing judicial and non-judicial foreclosures.103 In Kaymark, the Court
considered whether an entity enforcing a judicial foreclosure is a debt collector
under the Act.104 In ReconTrust Co., the Court considered whether an entity
enforcing a non-judicial foreclosure is a debt collector under the Act.105 Under the
Act’s general provision defining who is considered a “debt collector,” any entity
which attempts to collect a debt indirectly is considered a “debt collector.”106 There
are two conflicting views as how to evaluate non-judicial foreclosure in connection
with the general provision.
One view looks at the overall purpose of non-judicial foreclosure.107 Although
money collected from a non-judicial foreclosure does not come from the borrower
(but rather the buyer), that “does not alter the fact that any funds raised would
come as a result of the elimination of the debtor’s interest and equity in the
property.”108 A mortgage secures payment of a debt, and foreclosure is “the process
in which property securing a mortgage is sold to pay off the loan balance due.”109
Thus, at the very least, enforcing a foreclosure is an indirect means of collecting a
debt putting it within the purview of the Act’s general definition of debt
collection.110
A conflicting view looks squarely to the object of the actual foreclosure sale. 111
It does not contemplate what happens after the non-judicial foreclosure.112 The
purpose of a nonjudicial foreclosure is “to retake and resell the security, not to
collect money from the borrower.”113 In fact, without a deficiency action (in some
states such an action is not allowed after non-judicial foreclosure), the trustee
cannot collect the rest of the debt from the debtor. 114 This is because non-judicial
foreclosure is not annexed to the debtor’s debt, but purely deals with the security
interest.115 While it is true that funds collected from the trustee’s sale are used to
pay off the debt, the purpose of the trustee’s sale is to sell the security interest.116
103. See id. at 1039 (leaving the potential difference between judicial and non-judicial foreclosure for
another day).
104. See Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A, 783 F.3d 168, 178 (3d Cir. 2015).
105. Vien–Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 570 (9th Cir. 2016) (majority opinion).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6).
107. See Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1036 (2019); ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d at 580
(9th Cir. 2016) (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d at 581.
109. Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1033–34.
110. Id.
111. Vien–Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 2016) (majority opinion); Obduskey
v. Wells Fargo, 879 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 2018).
112. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d at 571; Wells Fargo, 879 F.3d at 1221.
113. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d at 571.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Id.
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The latter view, thus, distinguishes between judicial and non-judicial
foreclosures.117 A judicial foreclosure comes with an underlying deficiency
judgment attached to the sale.118 This shows that the object and purpose of judicial
foreclosure is, at the very least, an indirect attempt to collect money from the
debtor making an entity bringing a judicial foreclosure a debt collector under the
Act.119
The Supreme Court considered this distinction but left the issue open for another
day.120 However, had the Court distinguished between judicial and non-judicial
foreclosure, it could have reconciled ReconTrust Co. and Kaymark. ReconTrust Co.,
like Obduskey, dealt with an entity enforcing non-judicial foreclosure.121 Under the
latter view, such entities are not debt collectors under the Act.122 On the other
hand, Kaymark dealt with an entity enforcing judicial foreclosure and is thus an
indirect collector thereby qualifying as a “debt collector” under the Act.123 This
distinction may also explain the superfluity issue of the Act.124 Perhaps the Act’s
general definition excludes entities enforcing non-judicial foreclosure and the
limited purposes provision was meant to include such entities as debt collectors for
limited purposes.
C.

The Court was correct to limit its holding to entities enforcing non-judicial,
and not judicial, foreclosures.

The Court rationale for failing to make a distinction between judicial and nonjudicial foreclosures can perhaps be found in Justice Sotomayor’s concurring
opinion.125 The purpose of the Act is to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices”
and “promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection
abuses.”126 By considering entities enforcing non-judicial foreclosures as covered by
the Act’s general definition of debt collectors, although excluded by the Act’s
limited purposes provision, it is less of a stretch for the Court to hold that abusive
actions taken by such entities qualify as debt collection. 127 If non-judicial foreclosure

117.

See Obduskey v. Wells Fargo, 879 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 2018).
See id.
119. See id.
120. Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (2019).
121. Vien–Phuong Thi Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 570 (9th Cir. 2016).
122. Id. at 572. See Wells Fargo, 879 F.3d at 1221.
123. See Kaymark ex rel. Current v. Bank of Am., 783 F.3d 168, 178 (3d Cir. 2015).
124. See Obduskey, 139 S. Ct. at 1037.
125. Id. at 1040–41 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
126. Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
127. See id. (reasoning that Court’s opinion is does not apply to circumstances of abusive debt collection
practices).
118.
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was not an indirect attempt to collect a debt, it may have been harder to consider
such entities as debt collectors even when they engaged in abusive behaviors. 128
CONCLUSION

In Obduskey v. McCarthey & Holthus LLP, in light of statutory construction,
legislative history, and legislative intent, the Supreme Court correctly held that an
entity which enforces non-judicial foreclosures is not considered a debt collector
under the Act’s general definitional provision.129 However, the Court missed an
opportunity to reconciliate a circuit split when it declined to distinguish between
entities which enforce non-judicial as opposed to judicial foreclosures. 130
Ultimately, the Court was correct to leave the distinction for another day, since, by
declining to distinguish between judicial and non-judicial foreclosures, the Court
was forced to recognize entities enforcing non-judicial foreclosures as covered
under the Act’s general definitional provision.131 By recognizing such entities as
covered by the Act’s general definitional provision, it is less of a stretch for the Court
to rule that entities enforcing non-judicial foreclosures are transformed into debt
collectors when they engage in abusive debt collection practices.132

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See id.
Id. at 1040 (majority opinion).
See supra text accompanying notes 101–122.
See supra text accompanying notes 123–26.
Id.
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